

was a prodigious letter writer, but that both he and his family believed that letters should be destroyed. The biographer was therefore confronted by a lack of the personal material which lends the color of life to biography. Stanley Hall's reminiscences are full of a rich and various humanity. From an early age he had the instinct of self-observation, to which his later training gave precision and meaning. His early experience with his elders and his brothers and sisters, his reading, music, religion, his childish fears, the extraordinary perversions which he witnessed among his schoolmates at Worthington, all these are recorded with their effect upon him. "I must have been a strange combination of adventurous boldness and of cowardice," he writes. His sexual life, the inhibitions and misunderstandings of his youth in New England, is simply and honestly set forth. Nor does this frankness desert him when he tells of his later life surrounded with academic pomp and dignity. Writing that he might understand himself more fully, and realize how his psychology and philosophy grew out of basal and innate traits, he records with the gusto and naiveté of a Pepys things that are usually hidden. "I have never," he writes, "missed the opportunity to attend a prize fight if I could do so unknown and away from home." "Thrice I have taken *privatissime* dancing lessons." "In America and especially in foreign cities I found a guide to take me through the underworld at night to catch its psychological flavor." Thus Mr. Hall reminds us that to the psychologist life is an experiment and the world a laboratory; but so rich is the soil of human nature from which his psychology springs that life gains vital quality and the world a new interest by being made subject to scientific observation and inquiry. His science fulfills Pater's definition of philosophy, to sharpen one's perceptions and increase the avidity for experience. Philosophiren ist dephlegmatisiren vivificiren, quotes Pater in a famous passage. Stanley Hall's life is an example of this truth.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

Jung as Psychologist

Psychological Types, by C. G. Jung. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$7.50.

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS began to gain headway in this country after Freud, Jung and other continental authorities lectured at Clark University in the latter part of the first decade of the twentieth century. At that time all analysts were extremely scornful both of psychology and of psychologists. The latter were not allowed to speak of analysis above a whisper. Both in print and in conversation the psychologist was told that until he had been analyzed he could not even understand this difficult subject, much less criticize it.

But the psychologist, in spite of lack of encouragement, persisted in trying to pierce its mysteries. Indeed, many of them "underwent" analysis. Gradually the principles of psycho-analysis, with its technique, became common scientific property. When the smoke of mystery had been cleared away it was found that most of the new principles were not so new after all.

Some of the analysts came to understand as much. This enlightened group welcomed the psychologists, and not a few of them became interested in psychology. Gradually a better spirit arose. Now psychologists and the more

modern analysts can discuss their respective fields in a give and take way. This newer group of analysts realize that they are *behavior diagnosticians* and *teachers* and not *magicians*.

Jung does not belong to this modern school, but to the older group to whom present day psychology means very little. To him analysis is a "medicine."

He reflects this old fashioned exclusiveness very definitely in *Psychological Types*. There being no psychology worth his notice, perforce he must write one. So we find him becoming psychologist and philosopher. Those of us who know psychology and have some information about analysis wish that he had remained analyst.

To one who has struggled through *The Psychology of the Unconscious* the form of the present book does not come as a surprise. One finds here, as there, the same lack of clarity, the same teasing failure to come to close grips with Jung's logic. Indeed, from some examples he chooses and from some of the remarks of his translator (who suffers from the same affliction) one is almost tempted to believe that the book was activated by a wish to justify his obscurity by an appeal to "type"—since type is an inheritance, as the book will show, and one type cannot understand the words of a different type. His obscurity is thus justified.

According to Jung, objective psychology can go only a little way towards giving an adequate picture of the nature of the human "soul." Very few of the complex factors of human psychology can be witnessed and observed as measurable facts. That some of them can be so measured Jung tells us is shown by his *Association Studies*. If the reviewer may be allowed to break in upon the author's introverted thinking chain at this point, he would like to point out that considerable work on the conditioned reflex—glandular, muscular and emotional—demonstrates this still more clearly, but for Jung to take account of this work would seriously complicate his theory of the *unconscious*, both collective (phylogenetic) and individual (ontogenetic). Hence nearly all twentieth century psychology is ignored.

In Jung's psychology there are four "basic functions"—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. These are all coordinate but irreducible. The basis upon which he selects them is his own "general experience." Except for the last named, these are all old friends, but disguised in spiritualistic raiment. Indeed, in the sense in which they are used by Jung, they belong distinctly to mediaeval psychology.

One cannot go into a criticism of Jung's psychology. It is the kind the religious mystic must write in order to find justification for certain factors his training has forced him to believe must exist. It is a psychology in which all church doctrinaires can find a place. The "image" is innate; the libido, the unconscious, and the like are anthropomorphized and "energized."

With Jung as with Freud the church idea of the "devil" is brought over almost directly as the unconscious. Jung goes further than Freud. With Freud most of the symbolism, "ideas," etc., with which this devil, the unconscious, becomes laden come about through one mishap or another in the lifetime of the individual. But this does not make a powerful enough "devil" for Jung. Jung has a "collective unconscious"—due to our inheritance. "The primordial image (elsewhere also termed the 'archtype') is always collective, i. e. it is at least common to entire nations or epochs. In all probability the most important mythological motives are common at all times and races; I have,

in fact, demonstrated a whole series of motives from Grecian mythology in the dreams and phantasies of thoroughbred Negroes suffering from mental disorder." "The primordial image, therefore, is a recapitulatory expression of the living process." As the translator points out, although not in these words, this makes Jung's "magic" much more powerful than Freud's.

Leaving his psychology and coming to his discussion of types, we find that Jung no longer identifies the "thinking" type with the introvert and the "feeling" type with the extravert, as he did in his earlier works. If any one of the four above named primary functions habitually prevails in an individual, a corresponding type results. Furthermore, *every one of these types can be introverted or extraverted.* Hence the full list of psychological types is as follows:

Extraverts of the	{	Thinking type	Introverts of the	{	Thinking type
		Feeling "			Feeling "
		Sensation "			Sensation "
		Intuitive "			Intuitive "

The major two types are extravert and introvert. The extravert is oriented by the object, by external conditions. "If a man so thinks, feels and acts, in a word lives, as to correspond directly with objective conditions and their claims, whether in a good sense or ill, he is extraverted." The extravert is an exponent of the claims of society. He does or tries to do just what his environment from moment to moment needs or expects him to do. The weak point in the extravert's system of reaction is his own inward needs and requirements. To conform with the environmental demands he may even slight and starve his own physical and bodily needs. The extravert's danger lies in the fact that he becomes caught up in objects—losing himself in their toils. The functional and physical disorders resulting are compensatory in character. A singer whose increasing fame tempts him to overstep the safe bounds of energy expenditure is robbed of his high notes. The rapidly expanding social circle of the successful social climber may bring on the psychogenic state indicative of mountain sickness. The man on the point of marrying an idolized woman with none too unquestioned past suddenly is seized with a spasm of the oesophagus, forcing him to a regimen of two cups of milk in a day, slowly consumed. All visits to the fiancée have to cease. Hysteria is the most frequent neurosis met within the extraverted type. As historical examples of the extraverted type Jung gives Humphry Davy and Liebig.

The individual belonging to the introverted type is distinguished from the extravert by the fact that he is governed by subjective factors. The introvert is taciturn, impenetrable and often shy. The introvert interposes a subjective view between the perception of the object and his own action which prevents the action from assuming a character that corresponds with the objective situation. "Introverted consciousness doubtless views the external conditions, but it selects the subjective determinants as the decisive ones." For fear that some of his readers may accuse him here of introducing a supramundane, spiritualistic component in the human being, Jung hastens to explain what the term "subjective" should carry in his work. "As the subjective factor, then, I understand that psychological action or reaction which, when merged with the effect of the object, makes a new psychic fact."

The introvert and the extravert can be found in all classes among both men and women, in high society and in the working classes. Both types may be found in the same family, in spite of the greatest possible similarity of external

conditions (for which Jung offers no proof). They apparently have quite a random distribution (another asserted fact for which Jung offers no proof). If, under pressure from parent or other social forces, attempt is made to change the type of the individual, he becomes neurotic later and a cure can be successfully sought only in a development of that attitude which corresponds with the individual's natural way.

We shall not in the present review attempt to discuss the various subdivisions of these two general types.

Jung feels that he has made a real contribution to psychology. Types for him become a kind of philosophy of life.

Since types are fundamental and "dispositional," the individual can no more change his type than can the leopard his spots. The individual must, alone or by the help of the analyst, determine upon his type, chart his course accordingly upon the particular sea which floats his vessel.

According to the author, the understanding and admission of types by humanity at large brings about a wider understanding of human nature and should help to remove conflict. We must not only recognize that types exist but also the fact that "every man is so imprisoned by his type that he is simply incapable of a complete understanding of another's viewpoint. Without this recognition we must inevitably tread upon the toes of others. Each type, recognizing his own predilection, must abstain from casting indignities, suspicions and depreciatory valuations upon his opposing type."

It is difficult for the reviewer, possibly blinded by his "type," to see Jung's justification for such a classification. Only an adherent of his psychology, patched up as it is from speculations long outgrown, can feel any cogency in his reasoning. The book does not aid the science of psychology; it actually confuses it by unjustifiable and unsupported assumptions. Nor does it in the reviewer's opinion contribute to the technique of analysis. At best it seems to be but another justification of life's failures and to give one more shoulder upon which the weakling may lean.

Cannot we have a book some time which is based not so much upon unproven assumptions about inborn dispositions and inherited constitution (which cannot be changed), as upon the fact that we can by scientific training in infancy so shape the individual that he will develop without having his individuality pruned by society? And as our human subject grows up and begins to display his own variations in behavior (individuality), cannot he at the same time learn to steer his course in society without suffering anything more serious than a slap now and then? This would mean on the psychological side that there are as many types as there are individuals, which seems to be in line with common sense as well as modern psychology.

JOHN B. WATSON.

Labyrinth

Labyrinth, by Helen R. Hull. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.00.

THE trouble with the novel as a vehicle for ideas about human relations is that, after all, it is a novel, and one quarrels with its findings in general at the risk of having it pointed out that this is a special case. This trouble is, of course, a trouble that only the reviewer need worry over; it is a very neat advantage for the author that her book may assume as many forms as an Old Man

Copyright of New Republic is the property of New Republic and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.